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t

The foreign relations provisions of the Rome Treaty, the charter
of the European Economic Community (EEC),1 have occasioned
enthusiastic comment t hroughout the first decade of the Community's
existence.2 They appear on their face to e ndow the EEC with powers
over external relations that significantly outpace those of other inter
national organizations.3

Under these provisions the EEC may enter

into tariff,4 commercial,5 and association

6

accords with outside states

and international organizations, and establish other "needful" ties with
the latter groupings.7

In addition, the foreign relations provisions

t Assistant Professor of Law,
University. LL.B. 1965, Columbia

1

University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1959, Harvard
University. Member, D.C. Bar.

There are three European Communities : the European Coal and Steel Com
munity (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), and the
European Economic Community (EEC). Respectively, they were established under
the ECSC Treaty, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140; the Euratom Treaty, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958; and the EEC Treaty, March
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958. Throughout this review,
references to the "Community" and to the "Rome Treaty" or "Treaty" should be
understood to designate the EEC and the EEC Treaty. All quotations from the EEC
Treaty are from the unofficial translation provided by the Publishing Services of the
European Communities.
2 Representative appraisals include, e.g., Dupuy, Du Charactere Unitaire de la
Communaiute Economique Europeenne Dans Ses Relations Exterieures, 1963 ANN.
FRAN. DR. INTL. 779; Feld, The Competences of the European Communities for the
Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEX L. REV. 891 (1965); G. GIARDINA, CoMMUNITA
EUROPEE E STAT! TERzI (1964); Megret, Le Pouvoir de la Comm1mauti Economique
Europeene des Accords Internationaux, 1964 R.M.C. 529; Pescatore, Les relations
exterieures des Communaut.es Europeennes, 103 R.Ec. DES CouRs 134 (1961) [herein
after cited as Pescatore] ; P. RAux, LES RELATIONS ExTERIEURS DE LA CoMMUNAUTE
EcoNOMIQUE EuROPEENNE (1966).
s

For a careful comparison of the treaty-making powers of the EEC with those of
organizations, see Pescatore 53-67. For a treatment of the treaty
making powers of international organizations generally, see, e.g., Dupuy, Le Droit
des Relations entre Les Organizations, 100 REC. DES CoURS 461 (1960); Parry, Treaty
Making Power of the United Nations, 26 B.Y.I.L. 108 (1949); J. SCHNEIDER, TREATY
MAKING PowER oF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1959); H. SocrNI, GLI AccoRDI
INTERNAZIONALI DELLE 0RGANIZZAZIONI lNTERGOVERNATIVE (1963).

other international

4

5

EEC Treaty art 111.
EEC Treaty art 113.

6 EEC Treaty art. 238.
7 EEC Treaty art. 229-31.

See also, id. art. 230, 231.
(1314)
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charge the Community with administering a common external tariff
for third-state imports into the six member states,8 with developing a
common commercial policy governing patterns of trade between the Six
and the outside world,3 and with coordinating the positions of the
member states in other international economic organizations in which
they participate.10
Notably, these provisions seem to assign to the Community organs
a role of partnership with, if not dominance over, the member states in
discharging these responsibilities.

Particularly striking in this respect

are the procedural rules established by article 228 for the exercise of
the Community's treaty-making powers.1�
other international

organizations

that

The charters of the few

possess

a

foreign

relations

competence generally assign only the negotiating function to the inter
governmental organ and require the approval of the national parliaments
of member states a s a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the
negotiated accord.12
In contrast, article 228 confers overwhelming
responsibility for conducting the EEC treaty-making function upon the
Community organs,

leaving the

member

states

with

a

seemingly

marginal role in this area. Naming the EEC Commission-the organ
charged with furthering the "general interest" of the Community 13as the negotiator of Community accords, article 228 also provides that
these accords directly bind the member states upon conclusion by the
EEC Council.
s

In addition, the article requires the Council to consult

EEC Treaty art.

18 29.
-

9

EEC Treaty art. 111-16.
10 EEC Treaty art. 116.
11 EEC Treaty art. 228 provides :
1. Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between

the Community and one or more States or an international organization, such
agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. Subject to the powers
conferred upon the Commission in this field, such agreements shall be con
cluded by the Council after the Assembly has been consulted in the cases p ro
vided for by this Treaty.
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may, as a preliminary,
obtain the opinion of the Court of Justice as to the compatability of the con
templated agreements with the provisions of this Treaty. An agreement which
is the subject of a negative opinion of the Court of Justice may only enter
into force under the conditions laid down, according to the case concerned, in
Article 236.
2: Agreements concluded under the conditions laid down above shall be binding
on the institutions of the Community and on the Member States.
12 See, e.g., EFTA Treaty art. 41-2, which provides:

The Council may negotiate an agreement between the Member States and
any other State, union of States or international organization, creating an
association embodying such reciprocal rights and obligations, common actions
and special procedures as may be necessary or appropriate. Such an agree
ment shall be submitted to the Member States for acceptance and shall enter
into force provided that it is accepted by all the Member States. Instruments
of acceptance shall be deposited with the Gov.errunent of Sweden which shall
notify all other Member States.
(Emphasis added). See generally, authorities cited in note 3 supra.
13

EEC Treaty art.

157-2.
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with the European Parliament prior to concluding association accords
and empowers the Community Court to pass on the compatibility of
a proposed accord with the Rome Treaty. Article 228, in conjunction

with articles 236 and 238, restricts the participation of the member
states as such in the Community treaty-making process to requesting a
Community Court ruling on the compatibility of the Rome Treaty with
a proposed accord and to amending that Treaty to cure any incompati
bility declared to exist by the Court.
Writing some three years after the formation of the EEC, Pro
fessor Pescatore, presently a member of the Community Court, ap
praised the Community's treaty-making provisions as a "veritable
transfer of powers to the Community in the domain of external rela
14
In the same study he concluded that "in the sphere prescribed
Treaty,
it is the Community which from now on will act in the
by the
place and service of the States, and it is the [Community] which will
tions."

bind the States by its undertakings." 15 In the absence of substantial
Community practice under the relevant Treaty provisions, Professor
Pesa
c tore's projections were largely based upon an analysis of the
bare texts of the Rome Treaty and the underlying p olitical
economic objectives of that document.

and

The months and years following Professor Pescatore's appraisal
have provided a rich vein of material for students of the Community's

foreign relatio ns powers. Invoking article 238, the Community con
cluded association agreements with Greece, Turkey, a group of eighteen
African states (most of which were former French and Belgian

colonies) and Nigeria.16

Utilizing its powers under article 111 to

negotiate tariff accords with third states and groups of states, the
Community participated in the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of t ariff
bargaining in the GA TT, and concluded bilateral tariff accords with
In addition, it has completed negotiations with
Isra el and Iran.1 7
Lebanon on a commercial accord under article 113 entailing an ex

change of tariff concessions and the provision of technical assistance by
14

P escatore

15 Id.

134.

16 The Community has contracted the following association accords under article
238: Accord Creating an Association Between the EEC and Greece, [1963] E.E.C.J.O.
294 [herein after cited as the Greek accord]; Acco�d Creat �ng an Association Between
the EEC and Turkey,. [l.964] E.E.C.J.O. 3687 [heremafter c1t�d as the T urkish accord];
Convention of Association Between the EEC and the African and Malagasy States
Associat e d with this Community, [1964] E .E.C.J.O. 1431 [hereinafter cited as the
Yaounde accord] ; Agreement Establishing an Association Between the EEC and
MAT. 828-58 (unratified) [hereinafter cited
the Republic of Nigeria, 1966 lNT'L LEG.
as the Nigerian accord] .
have been concluded at the time of writing (February' 1968)
17 Tariff accords that
EEC and the State of Israel [1964]
include the Commercial Accord between the
E E C J.O. 1518; Commercial Accord between the EEC and the Imperial Go�ernment
0£° I�a� [1963] E.E.C.J.O. 2555; the "Dillon Round" agreement entered into by the
TT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
EEC w'it h the partners of the Six in GA
. 2889, �.l. A . S . No. 5253; and the "Kennedy Round"
July 16, 1962, [1962] 13 U.S.T
see Le Monde, 1 Jul. 1967, at 17.
agreement entered into on the same basis,
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the Six to bolster the Lebanese economic development program.18

In

its first decade, the Community has also established numerous tics with
international organizations 19 and has taken important steps in the
design and implementation of a common commercial policy linking
the Six with the outside worl d in economic matters.20
Though unavailable to Pescatore a s a source for his appraisal of
the EEC's foreign relations powers, the Community practice described
above provided a basis upon which subsequent commentators could
re-evaluate his earlier conclusions.

Later writers too, however, have

largely restricted themselves to the bare text of the Treaty and to
general principles and, not surprisingly, have arrived at even more
enthusiastic conclusions.
By ignoring Community practice as a clue to the scope of the
Community's foreign relations powers, the commentators have left many
serious questions unresolved.

One notable deficiency in the literature

is the absence of any systematic consideration of the extent to which
the Treaty texts have in fact been interpreted to facilitate the "transfer
of powers to the Community in the domain of external relations" pro
jected by

Pescatore.

Is the Community master, servant or equal

partner of the member states in the conduct of EEC foreign relations?
Again, the articles themselves abound with fundamental gaps and
ambiguities.

Only Community practice can serve to complete the

faltering or purposefully vague work of the Treaty's framers.

It is

that practice, for example, which will establish the content of the EEC's
"common commercial policy" and the permissible scope of a Community
"association accord," as those terms a r e used in articles 111 and 238
respectively.
Failure to examine the administrative machinery that has been
devised for managing Community foreign relations has Jeft obscure
the relative contributions of the Community organs, the member govern
ments, and national and Community-level private groups.

To what

extent, for example, is the EEC Commission subject to pressures from
these sources when it negotiates tariff and commercial accords of broad
economic import?

Furthermore, the formalistic inquiries of the com

mentators have not illuminated the emerging contours of the economic
and political objectives which guide the exercise of the Community's
foreign relations powers.
18

What policies influence the Community's

The EEC has successfully completed negotiations on an accord with Lebanon.

See the Accord on Commercial Exchanges and Technical Cooperation Between the

EEC and the Member States, on one side, and the Lebanon Republic, on the other,
1965 INT'L LEG. MAT. 728-32.

19 The Community has not published a schedule of its agreements with interna
tional organizations. It is known, however, that it has entered into agreements with
the International Labor Organization, see [1959] E.E.C . J. O. 521, and with UNESCO,
see 8 GEN. REP. 305 ( 1965) . A summary of the Community's rel ations with inter
national organizations during 1967 may be found at 10 GEN. REP. 378-81, 401-04 (1967).
20 See Everling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy iii the Euro
pean Economic Community, 4 COM. MAR. L. REV. 141 (1966).
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relations with the United States, the "Outer Seven," the Communist
bloc countries and the developing nations of Latin America, Africa and
Asia?

To what extent do those policies reflect Community autonomy

in the exercise of its foreign relations powers?
In The European Common Market and the World,21 Professor
Werner Feld has taken a giant step past existing appraisals of the
Community's foreign relations powers by rooting his study firmly in

the soil of a decade of Community foreign relations practice.
The
holder of degrees in law as well as in political science, Feld does not
minimize the significance of Treaty texts and other formal commit
ments of the member states as determinants of the scope of the Com

munity's foreign relations powers. On the contrary, the introduction
and first chapter of the study contain a comprehensive analysis of the
guidelines found in the Treaty and in general international law for the

exercise of these powers. But Feld also recognizes that the evolution
of independent Community control over its external relations threatens
entrenched governmental and private interests at the member state
Sensitive to the impact of these institutional stresses upon the
manner in which the formal texts have been interpreted, Feld probes

level.

many of the issues that have been largely ignored by previous com
mentators.

His use of interviews, questionnaires and other empirical

techniques further sharpens his exploration of these issues.

Thanks to

Feld's balanced perspective and disciplined investigative methods, the
reader comes away from The European Common Market and the World
with a sounder grasp of the gap between textual promise and actual
performance, the manner in which ambiguities in the Treaty text have
been resolved by hard practical decisions, and the intricate adminis
trative system that has been devised for the conduct of Community

The reader is also instructed in the policies pursued
by the Community in its dealings with the outside world.
The format of the study reflects Feld's twin objectives: portray
foreign relations.

ing the operation of the Community system in the elaboration of foreign
relations policies, and setting forth the content of these policies with
regard to different areas of the world. The book has t w o parts, the
As noted
first pursuing the form er objective, the second the latter.

above, the legal basis for Community involvement in external relations
The next
activity is recorded in the introduction and first chapter.
roles
and
relative
the
with
contributions
of
turn
in
deal
chapters
three
r
administ
national
ations,
six
and
the
the
organs,
ity
the Commun

the formulation of
private, national, and Community-level elites in
.
Feld
treats
successively
the Com
I n Part II,
Community policy.
r
s
ates,
membe
nonan
non-Europ
Europe
with
�
�
munity's relations
.
states, developing countries, and Communist
-world
free
d
rialize
"ndust
1
study by speculating about the likely shape
stat es. He concludes the
21

(1967).
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of future Community foreign relations policies, particularly as they
relate to the United States, and about the probable role of the Com
munity organs in their formulation and execution.
Professor Feld's treatment of the economic and political d imensions
of his subject is skillful and persuasive.

To this reader, however,

Feld's most valuable contribution is his systematic, empirical appraisal
of the respective roles of the C ommunity organs and the member states
in the formulation and execution
policies.

of Community foreign

relations

Summarizing his findings, Feld concludes:

As far as the making of external Community
concerned,

the member

governments generally

policy is
appear

to

have been the masters controlling this process and to have
used the EEC and the external policy instrumentalities it
offers for their own purposes.

On the other hand, the EEC,

acting as a unit through the Commission, so far has had only
limited success in directing how national economic policies are
to serve the Community interest.
ters affecting the

With the exception of mat

[common external tariff]

or

[common

agricultural policy] levies, the member governments

have

largely chosen when to use EEC or national policies for the
pursuit of their foreign economic policy objectives. They have
determined the form and substance of the EEC policies.

They

have closely controlled and supervised the activities of the
Commission when negotiating with third countries, permitting
the Commission only a minimum of discretion.

And they

have controlled to a large extent the execution of policies,
although the Commission, as guardian of the Community
interest, could admonish or even complain to the Community
Court in case of Treaty violation.

In fact, however, the Com

mission has been primarily the servant of the member govern
ments, collecting statistics, compiling information, coming
forth with ideas and suggestions, and elaborating recom
mendations for the reconciliation of the divergent interests of
the member states, but really not having more than an oblique
influence on the final deliberations and judgments of the
member governments.
the Parliament .

.

Other Community organs, such as

. , w hich also have been assigned roles

in the external policy making process, have been even less
influential than the Commission.22
These conclusions will touch off spirited debate among EEC
They clash with the seeming import of the treaty provisions

scholars.

which, like article 228, accord the Community organs a dominant role
22w. FELD, TaE EuRoPEAN CoMMoN MARKET AND THE WoRLo 162-63 (1967).
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in the formulation and pursuit of EEC external policy. They challenge
the consensus, among Community students regarding the purportedly
innovative nature of the EEC's powers in the international organiza
tions field. And they do not seem to square with the Community's
record of accomplishment over the last decade as measured by the num

ber and significance of its international agreements and its initial steps
in constructing a common commercial policy.
But this writer is convinced of the essential soundness of Feld's
position. The member states have in fact been successful in systemat

ically paring down the foreign relations prerogatives seemingly granted
the Community under the Rome Treaty. This generalization applies

with dramatic force to the stunted evolution of the Community's treaty
making power, a subject of special interest to the writer.23 As we have

seen, article 228 allocates responsibility for the conduct of the Com
munity treaty-making process among the Council, Commission, Euro
pean Parliament and Community Court, and virtually excludes the
member states as such from a significant role in this process. But how
has article 228 been applied over the last decade?

Though designated

as the Community organ that "negotiates" EEC accords, the Com
mission has been little more than the Council's agent or plenipotentiary
in treaty negotiations.24

The Parliament's influence has virtually been

eliminated by the Council's insistence that the former body be con
sulted

after rather

than

before

signature of Community accords.25

And

the Court has yet to pronounce on the compatibility of a Community
accord with the Rome T reaty, although seven
nine accords

27

26

of the Community's

directly confronted the Community with this difficult

issue.
The obvious beneficiary of the reduced influence of these Com
munity bodies is the Council and, through it, the member states them
selves.

Let it not be thought, however, that the shift of control to the

Council has been fortuitous.

On the contrary, the members of the

Council-themselves under instruction from their home governments
have engineered the shift through two basic techniques.

First, they

have narrowly interpreted key provisions of the Rome Treaty to enlarge
the residual treaty-making powers of the member states at the expense
of the delegated powers of the Community.

In doing so, of course,

they have displaced the Community Court as the arbiter of the scope
of the EEC's treaty-making power, a circumstance that goes far toward
23 See Costonis, The Treaty-Making Power of the Eitropean Economic
(March, 1968).
munity: The Perspectives of a Decade, 5 CoM. MAR. L. REV.
24 W. FELD, supra note 19, at 163.
25 See, e.g., Report, Eur. Par!. Doc. No. 61, 18 Sept. 1961; Report, Eur.
Doc. No. 94, 25 Nov. 1963.
2'6 The accords in question are the Greek, Turkish, Yaounde and Nigerian
ciation accords, the Dillon and Kennedy Round tariff accords and the Lebanon
mercial accord.
21 See notes 16-19 supra.

Com

-

Parl.
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explaining why the Court's jurisdiction under article 228 has not been
exercised since the Community's inception.

The technique of na rrowly

construing the delegated treaty powers also legitimates direct member
The
state intervention in the "Community" treaty-making process.
states have been quick to grasp the opportunity.

Their representatives

have participated as "national observers" in most of the Community
negotiating

sessions.

Furthermore,

their

executives

and

national

parliaments have signed and ratified each Community accord adjudged
by the Council to exceed the Community's competence.
In addition to construing the Rome Treaty narrowly, the Council
has carefully constructed the administrative machinery for the conduct
of Community treaty-making activity to guarantee a dominant role to
the member states.

Professor Feld provides an excellent description

of this machinery in chapters 2 and 4 of his book.

One might wish,

however, that he had given greater emphasis to the intimate relation
ship between the Treaty's construction and the choice of administrative
mechanisms.

Only by making the threshold determination that a given

matter touches upon a residual competence of the member states can
the Council legitimate direct member-state intervention in the Com
munity foreign relations process.
Is the existing trend irreversible?

Feld thinks not.

The develop

ment of a single internal market within the Community, he speculates,
may generate pressures on the member states to relax their grip on
the formulation and execution of concomitant external relations activi
ties.

Evidence of this possibility may be found in the agricultural field:

as the Community accedes to greater control over internal Community
agricultural policies, the member states have tended t o concede it a
greater role in shaping external policies in this area.

Feld also con

jectures that the member states may agree to coordinate their over-all
foreign relations policies outside the framework of the Treaty and the
Community.

While this step may eliminate conflicts among the mem

ber states, however, he properly questions whether it will lead to a
strengthened role for the Community.
Two other factors not explicitly t reated by Feld may also portend
an increased foreign relations role for the Community during the next
decade.

One is the growth of a habit of cooperation among the Six

resulting from their efforts to coordinate national viewpoints within a
Community framework each time a Community accord or e xternal
relations policy is debated in the Council.

It cannot be doubted, of

course, that considerably more than this habit and the machinery devised
to implement it is necessary to effectuate a meaningful transfer of
foreign relations powers to the Community.

At the same time, how

ever, the Community's existence is now a political fact which none
of the member governments can easily disregard.

To do so might

antagonize the other members or, worse still, dissipate the greater
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political leverage vis-a-vis third states that may accrue to a member
country through coordinated six-nation action.
An even more important factor has been highlighted by Walter
Hallstein, former President of the EEC Commission, in his farewell
address to the European Parliament:
Europe feels deeply that her form of life today is pro
foundly inadequate.

She continues to suffer gravely from the

gap between the vocation powerfully rooted in sentiment that
Europe has qualities that call her to assume a fundamental
responsibility in world politics and the inability to regroup
her resources and organize them to be able to fulfill this
vocation.

This is the true reason for the European malaise

of which so much has been said.28
From hardened Gaullists to committed Eurocrats, the undesirability
if not danger of the Six remaining fragmented in a world of super
powers i s uniformly recognized.

Whether the issues concern measures

of defense to deal with a feared United States economic imperium and
technical superiority, or the adoption of bargaining positions on tariff,
monetary or development aid questions before international organiza
tions, the leverage of the Six is immeasurably increased if they proceed
on the basis o f a truly common policy.

The rub, of course, is that in

pursuing policies orchestrated and directed at the Community level,
the member nations surrender pro tanto their control over the conduct
of their own external relations.

Although the advantages of common

action have been widely extolled i n the first decade of the Community's
existence, they have not proven sufficiently attractive to counter the
regressive forces that have stifled the evolution of the Community's
But they could easily prove overpowering
treaty-making powers.
should the next decade see a substantial increase in the pressures on
the Six generated by international economic competition and a decrease
in the hold that nationalism-whether strident or covert-exerts over
the behavior of the member states within the Community.
This review commenced with a summary of a number of central
issues that students of the Community's foreign relations powers have
tended to overlook. It would be too much, of course, to expect that a
single volume could remedy omissions of such long standing.
In

The European Common Market and the World, Professor Feld has
neve rtheless taken remarkable strides toward illuminating much that
was previously obscure. More important, perhaps, his volume con
stitutes a model of disciplined inquiry and thoughtful analysis· that
places all students of Community affairs in his debt.
28

Speech of Professor Walter Hallstein to the European Parliament,

21

June 1967.

